What I think would help this discussion is a clearer picture of how deep the DAO wants the liquidity pool to be for each pool. More emissions draws more liquidity. We have some data due to the falling ALCX price of the elasticity of liquidity to each pool per $ spent. Paying for more liquidity than is needed in the short term increases sell pressure which reduces the effect of emissions in the long term.
For a given target liquidity depth, renting liquidity through either LM rewards or Curve bribes is less expensive in the short term and more expensive in the long term. A well-reasoned emission structure therefore rents only as much as it needs to for its goals and uses any remaining emissions to buy rather than rent liquidity with the rest.
Buying in this case means emissions to OM bonds. Renting in this case means a combination of LM emissions to staked pools or Curve bribes. The data we have shows that bribes are currently more effective at renting liquidity than LM emissions. A 400 ALCX (~$150k) bribe recently boosted liquidity on alETH by about $300M. Bribing every 2 weeks at that rate would be about $4M. At that rate (which may not last) bribes are 10x more effective than LM emissions at renting liquidity. In that calculation bribes rent about $75 in liquidity per $1 spent as opposed to LM which rents about $6.
Anecdotally there's another example here: https://twitter.com/VotiumProtocol/status/1447550501109829633
~ $22M TVL jump for 9k invested. Bribes weekly, so that would be $468k annually to rent 22M liquidity. About $47 rented per $1 spent.
Given the data we have right now, I think the LM emissions to staked pools should be cut drastically and restructured to bribes. If we can decide on a liquidity depth we want for each pool and target a conservative $25-$50 rent fee that gives you an bribe target for that pool. Leftover emissions can largely be used to buy OP bonds so the DAO has to rent less and less liquidity over time to reach its targets.
When we have data on the effectiveness of the TOKE reactor we can revisit the conversation of owning liquidity versus owning liquidity directing rights (as opposed to renting liquidity direction rights via bribes).
